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Abstract - Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are critical 
infrastructure that are not immune to both physical and cyber 
threats. Vehicles are cyber/physical systems which are a core 
component of ITS, can be either a target or a launching point for 
an attack on the ITS network. Unknown vehicle security 
vulnerabilities trigger a race among adversaries to exploit the 
weaknesses and security experts to mitigate the vulnerability. In 
this study, we identified opportunities for adversaries to take 
control of the in-vehicle network, which can compromise the 
safety, privacy, reliability, efficiency, and security of the 
transportation system. This study contributes in three ways to 
the literature of ITS security and resiliency. First, we aggregate 
individual risks that are associated with hacking the in-vehicle 
network to determine system-level risk. Second, we employ a 
risk-based model to conduct a qualitative vulnerability-oriented 
risk assessment. Third, we identify the consequences of hacking 
the in-vehicle network through a risk-based approach, using an 
impact-likelihood matrix. The qualitative assessment 
communicates risk outcomes for policy analysis. The outcome of 
this study would be of interest and usefulness to policymakers 
and engineers concerned with the potential vulnerabilities of the 
critical infrastructures. 
Index Terms — Intelligent Transportation Systems, 
Cybersecurity, In-vehicle Network, Vulnerability, Risk 
Assessment, National Institute of Standard and Technology 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N the Wired article that broke the hacking of a Jeep 
Cherokee, researcher Charlie Miller was quoted as saying, 
“When you lose faith that a car will do what you tell it to do, it 
really changes your whole view of how the thing works.” [1] 
The high demand for cutting-edge technologies and the need 
to keep vehicles affordable are reasons why rigorous security 
measures and policies have not been prioritized in the past. 
Vehicles are becoming more intelligent with the constant 
demand for improvement of driver’s safety, comfort, and 
vehicle performance. Technologies are being deployed such as 
infotainment and safety monitoring applications in the 
vehicles to meet the demand for increased technology. 
According to the major automobile original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs), nearly 100% of new vehicles are 
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equipped with wireless technologies [2]. The security 
challenges become even more complex by the knowledge that 
60% of the 2016 vehicles come with internet connection 
capabilities [3]. 
The vehicle’s systems were designed without remote 
connectivity in mind and focused on vehicle safety and not 
security.  Car manufacturers achieved the former but not in the 
presence of an attacker in an adversarial environment. Current 
vehicles are computers on wheels equipped with Wi-Fi access 
points, Bluetooth modules, and dozens of Electrical Control 
Units (ECUs). Even further, cars are envisioned as platforms 
to offer on-demand technologies and services to the road 
users. Advancements that could transform cars to have the 
functions of personal computers and smartphones, but with 
numerous security vulnerabilities [4].  
The system should provide prevention strategies in addition to 
detection and recovery strategies to stop adversaries from 
causing any harm to ITS critical infrastructure. Such 
prevention strategies need to be built into the design from 
inception. Reasons to secure the in-vehicle network prior to 
implementation are [5]: (i) design phase is the most effective 
stage to prevent exposure, (ii) initial security consideration 
will prune research initiatives that are expensive to be secured 
once implemented, (iii) blind eye to attackers will endanger 
the system robustness, and (iv) security is crucial to 
government and customers. The real challenge emerges when 
an intelligent vehicle is placed into the vulnerable vehicular ad 
hoc network. An adversary can gain access to the in-vehicle 
network and be rewarded by ample access to the vehicle ECU. 
The adversary can take control of the vehicle braking system, 
engine, air conditioning system, and steering wheel are just 
steps needed to remotely-drive a vehicle.  
There is a gap in the current literature to assess and evaluate 
the impact of cyber/physical attacks on the road users and the 
system operators. This study attempts to survey the impacts of 
in-vehicle network security vulnerabilities and adds to the 
literature of ITS security and resiliency, by exploring possible 
consequences of an adversary compromising the in-vehicle 
system. To this extent, we aim to contribute to the nascent but 
growing literature of ITS security impact-oriented risk 
assessment. First, most of the previous studies have been 
limited to combine risks of a compromised in-vehicle network 
systematically. The bulk of this work is devoted to identifying 
security attacks against the in-vehicle network and to 
proposing defense and protection security mechanisms. The 
knowledge about the conceivable attacks and the performance 
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of the security mechanisms is still rudimentary. This 
deficiency urges the need for an impact-oriented analytic 
approach to identify system-level risk –that is an area of 
emerging research. A rigorous quantitative assessment could 
be conducted, but this is a difficult task because statistical data 
(collected through either revealed or stated method) is mainly 
unknown. As in-vehicle security impact assessment in 
transportation is active research with lacking numerical data of 
the executed security attacks, a comprehensive quantitative 
risk assessment methodology cannot be conducted. That is, in 
our second contribution we propose employing a qualitative 
risk-based approach for measuring risks and communicating 
the results for policy analysis. We employ National Institute of 
Standard and Technology (NIST) [6] risk-based model to 
conduct a qualitative vulnerability-oriented risk assessment. 
The risk-based approach of this study aims to identify adverse 
impacts that are caused by malicious adversaries exploiting in-
vehicle network security vulnerabilities. In our third 
contribution, we provide a rating of the risks’ likelihood and 
impact through a qualitative risk-based approach. Herein, we 
synthesize evidence from current literature and real-world 
hacking incidents to determine potential impacts of exploiting 
in-vehicle network vulnerabilities. We then map safety, 
operation, reliability, and security issues ensued by in-vehicle 
hacking incidents into a visual, matrix for risk prioritization 
purposes.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. First, we 
explain the risk assessment methodology of this study. 
Second, we investigate the threat events and threat sources to 
the in-vehicle network. Third, we evaluate the in-vehicle 
network vulnerabilities and determine the risks of such 
vulnerabilities to the transportation system. We conclude our 
study by suggesting countermeasures to prevent the failure of 
ITS critical infrastructure. 
II.  RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
The risk assessment methodology of this study incorporates 
the risk model proposed by NIST Special Publication 800-30 
(SP 800-30) [6]. The NIST risk assessment objective is to 
detect, evaluate and to prioritize risks to the system operations 
and assets [6]. In which the aim is to pinpoint insights to 
policymakers to support risk responses. To this extent, risk 
determination is conducted through identifying threats to the 
system, system vulnerabilities, consequences in case an 
adversary exploits those vulnerabilities, and the likelihood that 
impacts emerge. The deliverables of the risk assessment 
methodology will be the critical components for the risk 
management process [7]. The risk assessment is the second 
component of the risk methodology hierarchy that 
incorporates knowledge into the risk respond, the third 
component of the risk management (Figure 1). The four core 
elements (i.e., frame, assess, respond, and monitor) of the 
hierarchy constitute a comprehensive risk management 
process that ensures successful risk-based decisions that 
manage system’s risks from strategic to tactical level. 
 
Fig. 1. Risk Management Process (adapted from [7]) 
 
For this study, we employ the risk model proposed in NIST SP 
800-30 to conduct qualitative vulnerability-oriented threat 
analysis. The analytic approach of the risk assessment 
comprises of both qualitative assessment and impact-oriented 
analysis approach. Together, the qualitative assessment and 
impact-oriented analysis provide the level of detail to 
characterize adverse impacts for which likelihoods are 
identified. The risk-based approach of this study (Figure 2) 
includes (i) identifying threat sources and events, (ii) 
identifying system vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions, 
and (iii) determining adverse impacts and magnitude of 
impact. 
 
Fig. 2. Risk Model (adapted from [6]) 
III. THREAT SOURCE AND EVENTS 
“No matter what happens, don't panic,” said Charlie Miller to 
Andy Greenberg before he hacked 2014 Jeep Cherokee 
through the car entertainment system [1]. The most analogous 
scenarios with real-world settings are Miller and Valsak 
experiments [1], [8]–[11], wherein a driver was behind the 
wheel during the attack. In 2013, they hacked Ford Escape and 
Toyota Prius through a physical attack. They demonstrated 
their work in a real-world situation when a driver was behind 
the wheel. Several attacks were successfully executed such as 
killing the engine, disabling the brake, and altering the 
speedometer. Later in 2015, Miller and Valsak remotely 
hacked the Jeep Cherokee with a driver driving the car [1]. 
This hack occurred by rewriting the firmware to gain access to 
the car Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Examples of 
their attacks are (i) control of the engine, (ii) control of brake, 
(iii) control of steering wheel, and (iv) control of air 
conditioning system. The most important outcome of this 
attack is the reaction of the driver to the experience; the driver 
expressed his feeling as a “traumatic experience.” The 
experience was traumatic because the driver did not have any 
control over the vehicle while driving on the highway 
surrounded by other vehicles. The driver was helpless when 
hackers turned radio volume to the maximum volume and left 
him with no choice but to ask them to make it stop [1].  
Before the Miller and Valsak studies [9]–[11], other 
researchers have exploited vulnerabilities of the vehicle 
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systems that are based on the CAN bus technology. Hoppe et 
al. [12], indicated that by exploiting CAN bus security 
vulnerabilities, an adversary is capable of (i) compromising 
the availability of window lifts through DoS attack, (ii) 
compromising the availability of the warning light by keeping 
it dark, and (iii) removing airbag control modules from the 
system. They argued that an adversary could cause passengers 
discomfort and compromise their safety. Koscher et al. [13] 
examined the security of two 2009 model year passenger cars 
(researchers did not disclose the make and model of the cars) 
through reverse engineering, in both lab and test road settings. 
The researchers demonstrated that by taking control of even 
one of the car’s ECU an adversary can entirely compromise 
the car and that ECU can be reprogrammed even while 
driving. They were able to take control of several car 
components by hacking the vehicle (i) physically through the 
On-Board Diagnostic II (OBD-II) port, and (ii) remotely 
(with prior physical access) through car wireless interfaces 
(digital radio). These components include (i) radio, (ii) 
instrument panel cluster, (iii) body controller (e.g., door lock, 
trunk lock, and window relays), (iv) engine, (v) brakes, and 
(vi) heating and air conditioning. Later in 2011, Checkoway et 
al. [14] supplemented the Koscher et al. [13] experiment by 
attacking a modern vehicle remotely, without prior physical 
access. They were able to compromise the vehicle through 
several components entirely. These components include (i) 
diagnostic tool, (ii) media player, (iii) Bluetooth, and (iv) 
cellular communication. The dreadful reward of an adversary 
breaching through the wireless components is that he does not 
need to execute an attack immediately and can wait for a time 
to gain maximum benefit. 
Other researchers have also attempted to scrutinize 
the security of vehicles. Oka et al. [15] suggest that 
adversaries can breach into the in-vehicle network through the 
Bluetooth communication. They reviewed publicly available 
information and concluded that although it is difficult to pair 
with the built-in infotainment system, it is possible to 
compromise driver safety through the external infotainment 
systems via Bluetooth. It is even more likely for an attacker to 
inject false messages through the OBD-II port dongle by 
merely pairing his device or with a brute-force attack. Another 
study conducted by Foster et al. [16] assessed the security 
vulnerabilities of the aftermarket Telematics Control Units 
(TCU) that interconnect ECUs with external systems. They 
examined two threat models: (i) local (i.e., physical access to 
the TCU) and (ii) remote in which the attacker can 
compromise the vehicle without physical access. The results 
indicate that in both cases adversaries with adequate 
knowledge can compromise the vehicle through the TCU. The 
adversary can inject false CAN packets and fully control 
safety components of a vehicle such as a brake system. The 
researchers tested this attack in a real-world situation and were 
able to tamper with windshield wipers and the brake system. 
The Yan et al. [17] study indicates that it is 
conceivable to hack Tesla Model S sensors through the 
spoofing and jamming attacks. The study suggests that these 
attacks can trigger a crash and compromise the function of the 
self-driving vehicles. The study has some limitations such as 
the limited range of the attacks and the uncertainties that come 
with the possibility of on-road attack. Nevertheless, the impact 
of such attacks on road users’ safety is considerable and needs 
to be further assessed. These vulnerabilities are not the 
concern only of passenger cars but involve heavy commercial 
vehicles as well. Burakova et al. [18] assessed the security of a 
2006 Class-8 semi-tractor and a 2001 school bus that are both 
equipped with SAE J1939 standard; the J1939 bus is 
commonly used among the heavy-duty vehicles in the US, for 
in-vehicle communication and diagnostics. The study results 
indicate that an attacker with network access can compromise 
the ECUs and manipulate (i) gauges on the instrument cluster 
(e.g., oil pressure and battery voltage gauge), (ii) engine 
Revolutions Per Minute (RPM), and (iii) engine brake. In 
conclusion, the attacker with physical access to the in-vehicle 
network may override the driver and remotely control the 
heavy-duty vehicle.   
Jafarnejad et al. [19] were able to hack the Renault Twizy 
80 through exploiting vulnerabilities of the Open Vehicle 
Monitoring System (OVMS); the OVMS enables a driver to 
have remote access to electric car information such as battery 
level and location. They concluded that an adversary might 
override the driver and launch several attacks. These attacks 
are: (i) move the vehicle forward, and backward, (ii) change 
the speed of vehicle while in operation, (iii) cause damage to 
the engine, (iv) change motor direction at will, (v) distort a 
dashboard, and (vi) control the throttle. In 2015, white hackers 
physically breached into the Virginia State Police (VSP) 
Chevrolet Impala. A police officer who intended to start his 
duty was not able to shift the gear. The hacker was able to 
manipulate the speedometer and eventually shut down the 
engine. Tampering was initiated with the installation of a 
device in the car, capable of Bluetooth communication [20]. 
The experiment indicates that even a vehicle without design-
built advanced communication is a lucrative target for 
adversaries. In a real-world situation, consequences of a 
malicious behavior targeting state trooper vehicles can cause 
delay and disruption of a police operation. This event 
provoked VSP to support security-based research and to 
simulate such an event on its students to prepare them for 
unexpected attacks. Also, a private company designed a real-
time intrusion detection device to be plugged into the OBD-II 
[20]. Table 1 represents a summary of the experiments that 
attempted to hack on-the-market vehicles.  
The review of the existing literature suggests that a malicious 
adversary should have high-level of expertise, well resourced, 
and be capable of executing effective, continuous, and 
synchronized cyber/physical attacks. Vehicle security 
vulnerabilities are not only of today or past concern; these can 
accrue with vehicular ad hoc network security issues and 
could trigger dire consequences. The breach might prolong 
and contaminate other vehicles that are on the same network 
as the hacked vehicle. Breach propagation can disseminate 
over the ITS wide-range network like a virus goes from one 
computer to another. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF THE IN-VEHICLE NETWORK EVENTS 
1st author Year Vehicle Foothold Threat Model Attack Impact 
Burakova 
[18] 2016 
2006 Class-8 
semi-tractor 
and 2001 
school bus 
OBD-II Physical Taking control of gauges on the instrument cluster, engine rpm, and engine brake 
Yan [17] 2016 Tesla Model S Sensors Physical Trigger a crash, Compromise self-driving functions 
Higgins [20] 2015 Chevrolet Impala OBD-II Physical 
The driver was not able to shift the gear, tampering the 
speedometer, and kill the engine 
Greenberg 
[8], and 
Miller [10] 
2013 Ford Escape, Toyota Prius OBD-II Physical 
Disable brake, changed seatbelt setting, take control of 
steering wheel, spoofed GPS, distort a dashboard, and 
manipulate vehicle lights 
Koscher 
[13] 2010 
2009 model 
year passenger 
car 
OBD-II 
Physical & 
Remote 
(with prior 
physical access) 
Take control of radio; instrument panel cluster; body 
controller; engine; brakes; heating and air conditioning 
Greenberg 
[1], and 
Miller [11] 
2015 2014 Jeep, Cherokee 
Entertainment 
system –Cellular 
(Wi-Fi hotspot) 
 
Remote 
Take control of the engine, take control of brake. Take 
control of the steering wheel, control air conditioning 
system, traumatic driving experience, compromised 
driver privacy by tracing the location of the car through 
the GPS coordinates. 
Jafarnejad 
[19] 2015 
Renault Twizy 
80 OVMS Remote 
Move the vehicle forward and backward, change the 
speed of the vehicle, cause damage to the engine, 
changing motor direction, distort a dashboard, control 
the throttle 
Checkoway 
[14] 2011 
2011 model 
moderately 
priced sedan 
OBD-II, Media 
player, Bluetooth, 
and Cellular 
Remote Complete control over the car systems, car theft, and surveillance 
 
IV. SYSTEM VULNERABILITY   
Vehicles or “computers on wheels” are prone to 
cyber/physical attacks as a result of vehicle security 
vulnerabilities. A premium vehicle may consist of more than 
70 ECUs that are interconnected through the network data bus.  
This network consists of a core bus, the CAN, and sub-
networks which are: (i) Local Interconnect Network (LIN), (ii) 
FlexRay, and (iii) the Media Oriented System Transport [21]. 
CAN has been the de facto standard [22], [23], yet CAN 
vulnerabilities such as weak access control, no integrity and 
no authenticity, make it a potential foothold for adversaries to 
launch eavesdropping and replying attacks aiming for ECUs 
[24].  
One may claim that ECUs are hackable with significant 
effort through reverse engineering and carjacking, similar to 
the Koscher et al. study [13]. In fact, researchers have been 
demonstrating that attacks are possible with more ease 
remotely via Bluetooth, Cellular radio [14], [24], or through a 
malicious smartphone application [24]. In these attacks, 
although the physical access does not need to be granted, an 
attacker needs high-level knowledge of vehicle’s network 
architecture to hack the vehicle.  
A valid concern is that a sophisticated adversary can breach 
into the vehicular ad-hoc communication network and inject 
false information to an in-vehicle network and be rewarded 
with access to the ECUs [25]. The consequences might be to 
disable a braking system, shut down an engine, distort a 
dashboard, and manipulate the air conditioning system, lights, 
radio, driver seat, to name a few [13], [14], [24]. Beyond all, 
the worst-case scenario might be that an adversary fully 
controls a vehicle or in other words, remote-drives the vehicle. 
V. ADVERSE IMPACTS 
Researchers have paid a great deal of attention to the 
security aspect of vehicular network protocol and structure, 
but unfortunately, very little attention has been dedicated to 
assessing the impact of vehicle security breach on the 
transportation network. Although many studies suggest the 
presence of various security vulnerabilities within the in-
vehicle network, surprisingly, cyber/physical attacks impact 
assessment has not been extensively explored. Thus, we 
cannot say for sure what consequences such an attack can 
impose. This section represents possible adverse impacts of in-
vehicle network security breach. The implications are based 
on real-world studies that have focused on or alluded to the 
vehicle cyber/physical attack impacts on transportation.  
Characteristics of the intelligent vehicles are a “double-
edged sword.” Intelligent advancements offer substantial 
applications, but on the other hand, it stimulates security 
threats and malpractices. With the developments in the age of 
the ubiquitous Internet and cellular communication soon the 
conventional vehicles will be part of the Internet of Things 
(IoT), a new era that is called the Internet of Vehicle (IoV). It 
has been projected that approximately between 19 billion to 40 
billion of “things” will be connected through the Internet, and 
vehicles will constitute a substantial portion of the IoT [26]. 
With the emergence of the IoV and the progression of 
technology, adversaries will not limit themselves to the known 
attacks, but they will devise innovative attacks to exploit IoV 
vulnerabilities. The adaptiveness of the adversary promotes 
the need for more comprehensive strategies and out of the box 
perspective. 
While manufacturers, legal authorities, and service 
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providers are the core pieces of the transportation network, the 
ones who are disturbed the most by the security breaches are 
the road users. Examples of this scenario are the recent Yahoo 
[27] and Equifax [28] breaches, where privacy and security of 
millions of people were undermined, due to the system 
footholds. Attacks such as location tracking can jeopardize 
users’ privacy and impose problems for the road users. Also, 
the attack on vehicle security can lead to a sophisticated leak 
of private information. That is, by compromising the 
infotainment system, an adversary could eavesdrop 
passengers’ communications through the in-cabin microphone, 
and extract that data via the connected Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) channel [14]. Even minor information on specifications 
of the sensors, used in the physical infrastructure of a vehicle, 
impart reliable information on the make and model of the 
vehicle [29]. In the Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET), 
vehicles are configured to send timestamps, identifiers and 
hello beacons periodically to communicate with other 
vehicles. Eavesdropping this information could trigger 
sophisticated privacy concerns than location tracking [29]. For 
example, through reading the hello beacons associated with a 
specific identifier, an adversary could gain access to 
information related to individuals’ arrival and departure. 
Unauthorized investigation parties can also use this 
information that can impose severe consequences.  
Imperative to note that there is no clear way of defining 
privacy and setting its boundaries. The degree of privacy is 
dependent on many factors such as user preferences, 
environmental settings, and application. Sometimes privacy 
can even be entangled with regulations of a country. This 
ambiguity is the main reason for the lack of considerable 
efforts to accommodate privacy in transportation systems, on a 
global scale. For instance, to fulfill certain levels of privacy, 
any necessary connections to some fixed physical or software 
infrastructure has to be avoided, which happens to be a hard 
task to be undertaken by the manufacturers at a technical level. 
Other than that, a substantial problem emerges when security 
and privacy happen to contradict each other in specific 
scenarios. The information breach on specific sensors can be 
an excellent example of this scenario. That is, sensor 
information might be used for designing intrusion detection 
mechanisms, while at the same time sensors can be a foothold 
for adversaries to compromise the system’s privacy. Some 
frame the discussion of privacy between two extreme edges of 
full anonymity or no privacy at all. How to find the proper 
trade-off is still an open problem to be solved. A universal 
business model needs to be developed via an international 
effort of technical parties as well as legal authorities.  
Disruption of the ITS network usually comes with monetary 
loss. These losses can affect both operators and users of the 
system. A sophisticated adversary can cause traffic 
congestion, driver confusion, driver distraction, and may be 
able to disrupt the system availability, which dictates 
unexpected operation cost [30] (e.g., time and labor cost). 
Schoettle and Sivak [31] surveyed 1,533 individuals and found 
that almost 70% of US participants are moderately or highly 
concerned about security and data privacy breaches when it 
comes to the automated vehicle technology. In fact, the 
presence of any vulnerabilities may lead to the point that 
public loses trust in the system. 
As far as the consequences of in-vehicle network security 
vulnerabilities are concerned, several impacts can be singled 
out. These consequences are mainly concerned with 
transportation’s safety, operation, efficiency, security, and 
reliability, and drivers’ behavior. The hacking in-vehicle 
network may impose ruinous damages by compromising road 
users’ safety. Safety concerns have been identified in several 
studies (e.g. [12]). Taking control of the engine, brake, 
steering wheel and throttle [10], [11], [19] to supersede the 
driver, compromises the safety of the targeted driver and his 
adjacent drivers. Also, tampering with air conditioning 
system, radio volume and distorting the dashboard [10], [11], 
[18], [20] not only compromise the traffic safety but leave a 
driver in a traumatic state, a state that can contribute to 
impulsive behavior. 
Beyond the concerns mentioned above, a malicious 
adversary may compromise the road users’ privacy through 
tracking attack. Such an attack can deteriorate if coupled with 
malware installation. Compromising in-vehicle network, 
impose monetary losses for road users and transportation 
operators – also, recuperating from an attack takes time. In-
vehicle network vulnerabilities can cause users and 
government distrust. Moreover, individuals and companies 
might file a lawsuit against car manufacturer and authorities. 
Also, attacks can negatively affect the transportation 
efficiency by increasing the influenced vehicles’ energy 
consumption [32]. Since there are not many studies to 
scrutinize attacks’ consequences on road users and authorities, 
security attack impacts on transportation network shall be 
investigated more in-depth through stated and revealed 
methods (e.g., [33]–[38]). 
The likelihood-impact matrix (Figure 3) represents the in-
vehicle network security vulnerability impacts into a 3×3 
matrix for risk prioritization purposes. The matrix links each 
of the adverse impacts to the three impact and likelihood 
clusters (low-, medium- and high-risk) to help decision-
makers prioritize risks that are associated with hacked 
vehicles. Risk assessment result indicates that (i) safety (e.g., 
injury and fatality crash), operational (i.e., monetary loss), 
security (compromising driver’s privacy based on the context), 
and behavioral (i.e., driver’s distraction) impacts are 
associated with the high-risk cluster, and (ii) security (i.e., 
vehicles become a foothold in ITS), legal exposure, reliability 
(i.e., road users distrust the system), efficiency (i.e., passenger 
discomfort) and operational (i.e., congestion) impacts are 
associated with the medium-risk cluster. More research can 
supplement the risk analysis studies and help policymakers 
provide flexible solutions to mitigate the risk of cyber/physical 
attack regarding an in-vehicle network. 
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Fig. 3. The Impact-Likelihood Matrix maps the adverse impact of in-vehicle network hacking into high- (colored in 
red), medium- (colored in yellow), and low-risk clusters (colored in green)  
 
VI. COUNTERMEASURES 
This study objective is to raise awareness among 
transportation operators and traffic engineers to employ 
cybersecurity best practices to ensure:  
(i) Security by design from inception,  
(ii) Out-of-the-box solutions by examining the 
system as a whole not a collection of isolated 
components,  
(iii) Redundancy solutions for critical cyber-physical 
systems,  
(iv) Road users and operators familiarity with 
possible attacks and adequate training for them 
to react promptly to the attack, and  
(v) A partnership among diverse resources (e.g., 
exercising white hackers), to bring innovative 
ideas and to portray the vulnerability of the 
system before the large-scale implementation.  
The presence of any vulnerabilities triggers a race against the 
clock among adversaries and security experts. Thus, the in-
vehicle network needs to be continuously assessed for 
potential vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scanning and 
penetration testing are among the primary solutions to assess 
the security and resiliency of the system against cyber threats 
[39]. Penetration testing is possible through sandboxing event 
and by inviting white hackers to identify system 
vulnerabilities in a controlled scenario. Besides, cyber 
hygiene; deployment of fault detection and isolation 
techniques (e.g., application of intrusion detection systems); 
and full confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity 
threat analysis [39] are possible countermeasures that ensure 
security and resiliency of the in-vehicle network.  
As stated earlier, CAN is the de facto communication protocol 
that connects ECUs within the in-vehicle network. ECUs are 
minicomputers, which have a specific task of automotive 
related duty. ECUs’ tasks associated with, but not limited to, 
engine control, brake control, timing module. All the critical 
safety tasks are performed by ECUs that is, plausible to 
conclude that passenger’s safety is dependent on the security 
and proper functionality of ECUs as stated in [14] “an attacker 
connected to a car’s internal network can circumvent all 
computer control systems.”  
The deficiencies in automobile cyber-security stem from the 
fact that CAN protocol has a broadcast nature and does not 
support message confidentiality, authenticity or integrity. This 
provides the incentive for researchers to investigate the 
shortcomings of CAN protocol regarding security, and 
introduce reliable measures for automobiles. These 
contributions fall into three main categories, (i) protocols, (ii) 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and (iii) preventive 
methods, explained in detail below.  
Different protocols have been proposed as an alternative to the 
conventional CAN protocol. Cryptographic solutions have 
been immensely investigated to secure CAN protocol as far as 
the authenticity and integrity measures are concerned. 
Message authentication codes (MACs) and digital signatures 
are some of the few approaches [40] to be named here. CAN+ 
[41] for instance, tries to overcome the problems of 
cryptographic methods by using out of band channels for 
transmitting the cryptographic bits. However, the main 
drawback of this scheme and similar solutions is the backward 
compatibility issue. Nilsson et al. [42] attempted to overcome 
the backward compatibility problem by authenticating 
multiple messages, which is less than optimal due to the use of 
multiple messages, which gives space to hackers for the 
intrusion. While Cryptographic methods provide secure 
solutions for CAN protocol, they may not be sufficient for 
providing a robust security mechanism. The reason is mainly 
that standard CAN frame only accommodates up to eight 
bytes. That is, CAN Cryptographic solutions might be 
vulnerable to the brute force attacks. 
The second line of defense that offers solutions to the CAN 
security vulnerability problem includes IDSs. Unlike protocol 
security measures, IDSs can be mounted into the current CAN 
bus as a software patch that is completely aligned with the 
backward compatibility requirement. The state-of-the-art IDS 
mechanisms rely on a technique named fingerprinting. 
Fingerprinting generates templates for the network legitimate 
devices and uses the templates for identification purposes [43] 
– these feature templates are called fingerprints. In brief, any 
message that is to be transmitted into the CAN bus needs to 
match to the fingerprint of its source device or ECU. 
Otherwise, it will fail the identification step and will not be 
transmitted. Since fingerprints are usually extracted from the 
Low Medium High
Safety Impact: crashes with severity level of 
Injuries and fatalities Safety Impact: property damage crashes
Behavioral Impact: traumatic experience that can 
contribute to an impulsive driver’s behavior; 
Drivers' distraction
Security Impact: to compromise vehicles’ 
availability; To compromise driver’s privacy; to 
track road users’ trajectories; Eavesdrop 
passengers’ communications
M
ed
ium Legal Exposure: due to losses, individuals and companies might file a lawsuit against 
manufacturer and authorities
Operational Impact: taking control of vehicle and 
compromise vehicle’s critical components (e.g. 
engine, brake, steering wheel); Disabled and 
crippled services
Operational Impact: monetary loss of road users 
and system operators
Efficiency Impact: cause discomfort to passengers
Reliability Impact: attacks on in-vehicle network 
can cause road users to distrust the intelligent 
vehicles, as well as the VANET future 
implementation 
LIKELIHOOD
IM
PA
CT
Hi
gh Security Impact: vehicles becomes a malicious node in the ITS network
Lo
w Efficiency Impact: increase in energy 
consumption
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analog physical layer signal, this type of identification is 
called, physical layer identification (PLI) systems [43]. 
Examples of PLI based IDSs can be found in the literature that 
uses different features such as the line voltage [44]–[46] or 
clock skews [47] for extracting fingerprint templates.  
Last, not least, it is evident that the automobile’s security can 
be compromised through physical access [13] or a wireless 
connection [14]. The former is easily avoidable and brings in 
minor technical concerns, whereas the wireless connections 
established from the uncertified users are a matter of concern. 
Securing the wireless links is a problem that has been under-
evaluated. So far, the telematics port or Bluetooth connection 
have been the primary source of security vulnerabilities. That 
is, footholds for adversaries to gain access to an automobile to 
inject malicious messages. Spaur et al. proposed a new 
telematics unit with certain access restrictions at [48] aiming 
to control the flow of messages into the vehicle through the 
cellular network. Based on their approach, this telematics 
ports is equipped with a security controller, which is built 
based on digital certificates. The controller grants access to 
certified users only. The security of telematics ports, even 
though essential, has been neglected in the current literature. 
The telematics ports have always been the most common and 
accessible footholds for malicious adversaries. To preclude 
intrusions right at the starting point, in-built security solutions 
–rather than reactive response– should be implemented. 
The contributions to the field of automobile cybersecurity are 
well summarized in the three categories above. However, a 
robust framework offering a secure end-to-end physical 
platform is noticeably missing in state-of-the-art research. 
Providing awareness in public, as well as among professionals 
is of major importance, to bring the necessary attention to the 
transportation cybersecurity problem. The more significant 
problem, however, appears when security and privacy are 
taken into account at the same time. These two critical aspects 
of transportation systems are most of the time aligned in same 
directions and occasionally in opposite directions where 
findings an optimal solution for this tradeoff is very 
complicated. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
ITS projected to augment safety, comfort, transportation 
efficiency, and to overcome the environmental impacts of 
transportation, but in the presence of security footholds all can 
dim. In the presence of any weaknesses, attackers can exploit 
ITS availability, authentication, integrity, and privacy security 
goals. Moreover, many questions need to be resolved before 
the vehicular ad hoc network large-scale implementation. For 
instance: (i) what would be the impact of known/unknown 
cyber/physical attacks on transportation? (ii) How should road 
users respond to the vehicle hacking incidents? (iii) Do road 
users need to be trained for cyber intrusion events? Moreover, 
(iv) Whom should road users reach for fixing their cars to 
recover from a security attack?   
Security is a core technical challenge of the ITS that if not 
appropriately maintained, will drastically affect road users and 
system operators. Lessons learned from this study depict that 
road users’ safety, privacy and security can be compromised 
due to the vehicle security vulnerabilities. Adversaries not 
only can take control of vehicles but can compromise the 
traffic safety and leave a driver in a traumatic state. 
Eventually, adversaries will supersede drivers to remotely-
drive vehicles shortly.  
This study offers an early assessment of the risks to the in-
vehicle network. We employed the NIST risk assessment 
approach for risk determination. The risk assessment 
methodology conducted in identifying threats to the system, 
system vulnerabilities, adverse impacts in case an adversary 
exploits those vulnerabilities, and the likelihood that impacts 
will occur. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is 
the first attempt to systematically assess the risks of a 
compromised in-vehicle network in the transportation domain. 
The current literature is mainly devoted to detecting security 
threats and to suggesting protection measures against the 
identified and future security attacks. While the knowledge is 
lagging behind the state-of-the-art, the need for an impact-
oriented analytic assessment to identify system-level risks is 
of vital importance. That is, this study aims to contribute to the 
body of knowledge of ITS security and resiliency by 
employing a qualitative risk-based approach for measuring 
risks and communicating the results for policy analysis. We 
summarize the main findings of the study as follows: 
• An adversary can compromise the in-vehicle network 
due to the CAN vulnerabilities such as weak access 
control, no integrity and no authenticity. That is, a 
malicious adversary with high-level of expertise, well 
resourced, and capable of executing effective, 
continuous, and synchronized cyber/physical attacks, 
can exploit vehicle security vulnerabilities. As far as the 
connected/automated vehicle technology is concerned, 
these security vulnerabilities can accrue with VANET 
security issues. The security attack might extend and 
contaminate other vehicles that are on the same network 
as the compromised vehicle. Breach propagation can 
disseminate over the ITS wide-range network like a 
virus goes from one computer to another. 
• The risk determination of an adversary compromising 
the in-vehicle network can be categorized into high-, 
medium-, and low-level risk clusters:  
o High-risk cluster: safety (e.g., injury and 
fatality crash), operational (i.e., monetary 
loss), security (compromising driver’s privacy 
based on the context), and behavioral (i.e., 
driver’s distraction) impacts.  
o Medium-risk cluster: security (i.e., vehicles 
become a foothold in ITS), legal exposure, 
reliability (i.e., road users distrust the system), 
efficiency (i.e., passenger discomfort) and 
operational (i.e., congestion) impacts. 
• A rigorous solution offering a secure end-to-end 
physical platform is noticeably missing in state-of-the-
art research. Providing awareness in public, as well as 
among professionals is of vital importance, to bring the 
necessary attention to the transportation cybersecurity 
problem. The more significant problem, however, 
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appears when security and privacy are considered at the 
same time. Security and privacy aspects of the 
transportation systems are most of the time aligned in 
same directions and occasionally in the opposite 
directions where offering an optimal solution to this 
tradeoff is a complex task. 
This study indicates a high level of uncertainty in the 
impact of a security breach on the in-vehicle network, 
especially on road users and the transportation network. There 
is a gap in literature to assess and evaluate the impact of 
cyber/physical attacks on the road users and the system 
operators. The result of this study endorses the necessity of 
impact assessment on the in-vehicle network security breach. 
Impact assessment results will be of great benefit to the risk 
management studies for the provision of realistic solutions 
against security attacks. Incorporating the outcomes of the 
impact assessment and the risk management provides a 
realistic analysis of the risk evaluation. Also, the impact 
assessment will help policymakers and system operators to 
prioritise strategies to mitigate security risk. 
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